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1. Introduction 
Which type of finance is the optimal driver of economic development in 
developing countries? Already as early as 1911 Schumpeter stressed the 
importance of financial markets in understanding economic development. 
Ever after countless studies have been undertaken to exactly understand the 
link between finance, economic development and growth. According to one 
school of thought, financial development is an “overstressed determinant of 
economic growth” (Lucas, 1988:6). Miller (1998:14) counteracts “that financial 
markets contribute to economic growth is a proposition too obvious for serious 
discussion”. To the supporters of the latter view, the correct question should 
not be if, but how financial development can affect economic growth. 
Financial development leads not only to an increase in the quantity of capital 
but, more importantly, also to an improvement in the quality of capital. It is 
through the quality of capital that finance contributes to growth. 
In this study we provide new insights regarding whether and how 
financial development can affect economic growth by focusing on one specific 
financial instrument: project finance. The use of project finance has grown 
dramatically over the years from $ 12.5 billion (bn) per annum in 1991 to $ 
113.4 bn in 2005.1 Financing almost 4,000 projects in 113 countries the total 
amount of project finance raised between 1991 and 2005 amounts to $ 1,077 
bn.  While the US with $ 186.4 bn accounts for most project finance (followed 
                                                 
1 As reported by LPC Dealscan. The dollar amounts are nominal and reflect the debt portion 
in the financing of the projects. 
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by Australia and the UK), this form of financing has also been used 
extensively in emerging economies: such as in Taiwan ($ 64.2 bn), China ($ 
58.9 bn) and Malaysia ($ 46.5 bn). Compared to other regions, Asia Pacific 
attracts most project finance (combined: $ 459.8 bn). As this region is also 
characterized by strong economic growth, it is surprising that no study has 
yet investigated project finance as a driver of economic growth.  
Project finance is designed to reduce of transaction costs, in particular 
those arising from a lack of information on possible investments and capital 
allocation, insufficient monitoring and exertion of corporate governance, risk 
management, and the inability to mobilize and pool savings. Project finance 
should thus have a clear impact on economic growth, especially there where 
financial development is shallow. Our empirical analysis of 90 countries from 
1991 to 2005 confirms this hypothesis. Project finance is found to be a strong 
driver of economic growth in low-income countries where transaction costs 
are particularly high. Controlling for initial conditions and other economic 
factors, a move from the 25th to the 75th percentile in project finance will 
increase annual growth by 2.0 percentage points.  
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews 
the existing theoretical and empirical evidence of financial development as a 
driver of economic growth and motivates why project finance should be a 
particularly strong driver of growth in low-income countries. Section 3 
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presents the data and methodology while section 4 discusses the results of 
the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Financial development, project finance and economic growth 
2.1. Theory and evidence on the finance-growth nexus 
In the classical literature the link between finance and growth is 
through capital accumulation or the quantity of capital: economic growth is 
the result of increases in innovation, human capital and physical capital. As 
finance develops, it increases the quantity of capital and thereby creates 
economic growth. However, as Schumpeter (1911) pointed out, this view 
ignores a very important channel. In his perception, finance stimulates 
growth not by creating more savings and thus increasing the quantity of 
capital, but rather by allocation savings better and stimulating technological 
innovation: increasing total factor productivity (TFP), e.g. improving the 
quality of the capital. 
In theory, financial markets can stimulate the quality of capital in 
several ways (Levine, 1997). Firstly, well-developed markets improve 
resource allocation and allow easier access to capital for entrepreneurs, thus 
lowering their financial constraints and financing costs (Tobin and Brainard, 
1963; Boyd and Prescott, 1986). Secondly, financial markets play a vital role 
in corporate governance by dealing with agency costs and informational 
asymmetries (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). Thirdly, markets facilitate the 
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pooling and sharing of risks. Through financial markets, investors can 
diversify their portfolios and minimize idiosyncratic risk. In addition, 
markets allow not only for the insurance of liquidity risk through banks but 
even for intergenerational consumption smoothing through pension funds. 
Fourthly, markets mobilize and pool savings and fifthly they ease the 
exchange of goods and services. Empirical evidence supports the view that 
financial markets stimulate economic growth. King and Levine (1993a, 
1993b) show that economic growth increases as the financial system develops 
and deepens while Levine and Zervos (1996, 1998) document that larger and 
better developed stock markets contribute directly to economic growth. 
There are, however, few guidelines on how to develop financial 
markets when they are still nascent. This gives cold comfort to the large 
group of emerging economies that have yet to develop their financial 
markets. If such countries nevertheless want to increase their growth while 
still reforming their financial sector, they might simply consider importing 
finance from abroad in the form of international capital flows. International 
capital can provide many of the advantages of a domestic market: 
International capital flows can increase the relatively low capital stocks, can 
lower the relatively high costs of capital that most emerging economies are 
faced with (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000) and can increase the scope of risk 
diversification (Voth, 2003).  
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As for domestic financial markets, it is the quality of international 
capital that matters, not the quantity. The direct quantity-effects of 
internationalization might not be very big2 while liberalization often leads to 
financial crises which can severely destabilize the local economy (Allen and 
Gale, 1999; Krugman, 1999). Liberalization should therefore be carefully 
sequenced (McKinnon, 1991; Edwards, 1990) as not all capital is equal. ‘Hot 
money’ in the form of short-term foreign currency denominated debt if far 
more risky than long-term local currency denominated equity.3 An economy 
should first focus on those relatively safe capital flows. Only when its 
domestic markets are developed enough can it benefit from other riskier 
types of capital. 
The question remains which types of capital are suitable for emerging 
economies when domestic financial markets are nascent and international 
capital flows are risky. Two candidates have been put forward in the 
literature: Portfolio equity investments and foreign direct investment (FDI). 
International equity inflows are known to reduce the cost of capital for 
domestic firms, increase risk sharing and stimulate the improvement of 
corporate governance (Claessens et al., 1995). However, a country can only 
receive equity inflows if the domestic stock market is well developed. As most 
                                                 
2 Benefits amount to approximately a 0.5% permanent increase in consumption for developed 
economies (Mendoza and Tesar, 1998) and 1% for emerging economies (Gourinchas and 
Jeanne, 2006). Market distortions can further reduce this benefit (Matsuyama, 2004) or can 
make it even negative (Boyd and Smith, 1997). 
3 Short-term foreign debt relative to foreign exchange reserves has actually been identified as 
the single most important predictor to financial crises by Rodrik and Velasco (1999). 
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developing countries have at best a fledgling and still illiquid equity market 
(Knight, 1998), this puts severe limitations on the use of international equity 
financing. FDI, like equity, is long-term in nature and minimizes currency- 
and maturity-mismatches. It is also beneficial in terms of transfers of 
technology, managerial skills and labor practices, access to new markets and 
production networks and the import of corporate governance. Importantly, 
FDI does not rely on the existence of a well-developed domestic financial 
market and firms can in part substitute the domestic financial market 
through FDI (Hausmann and Fernández, 2000). Through FDI a firm exerts 
direct control over the operations, reduces informational asymmetries and 
can thus alleviate some of the problems associated with inadequate contract 
enforcement and poor protection of intellectual property rights. 
Given the long list of benefits, it is not very surprising that FDI has 
been found to have a positive effect on economic growth (see e.g. Reisen and 
Soto, 2001). However, most studies do not find an unambiguously positive 
relation between FDI and growth. The effectiveness of FDI appears to be 
contingent on the economic and financial development of the domestic 
country indicating that even FDI is only beneficial if a certain threshold of 
development has been reached. Lack of human capital (Borensztein et al., 
1998), underdevelopment of financial markets (Alfaro et al., 2004) or 
institutions (Durham 2004) and trade restrictions (Balasubramanyam et al., 
1996) can prevent the positive effects of FDI to be disseminated to the local 
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economy. For example, FDI can stimulate the import of good corporate 
governance. However, FDI can only do so when certain legal standards are 
present in the host country. During the Asian crisis, countries with better 
disclosure requirements had better stock price performance (Mitton, 2002) 
and the countries with the weakest outsider investor protection experienced 
the largest stock market and currency crashes (Johnson et al., 2000). In 
general, Blomström et al. (1992) show that FDI provides positive growth 
effects only for high-income countries but not for low-income countries. 
Similarly De Mello (1999) shows that only OECD countries are able to benefit 
from positive spillover effects of FDI as measured by TFP gains. The gains of 
FDI to developing countries are limited to quantity effects which, as we 
pointed out above, are not very big. 
In sum, we perceive the evidence on the finance-growth nexus as 
follows. It is the quality and not the quantity of finance that matters. Finance 
creates spillover effects in terms of TFP gains that foster economic 
development and growth. Foreign sources of capital such as portfolio equity 
finance or FDI can also create positive spillovers, in the best case 
compensating for the absence of well-functioning domestic markets. However, 
even FDI, though generally considered one of the safest and most beneficial 
types of foreign capital, is much less effective in the least developed markets. 
In the next section we therefore set out to argue that the unique properties of 
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project finance make it well suited to substitute an underdeveloped domestic 
financial market.  
 
2.2. The growth-enhancing properties of project finance  
Project finance can be defined as “the creation of a legally independent 
project company financed with equity from one or more sponsoring firms and 
non-recourse debt for the purpose of investing in a capital asset” (Esty,  
2007). Project finance is generally used for new, stand-alone, complex projects 
with large risks and massive informational asymmetries. Nevertheless, 
sponsors’ equity contributions are small and the bulk of the financing is 
provided in form of non-recourse, syndicated loan tranches. The lead banks 
become project insiders through working with the project sponsors during the 
initial screening and structuring phase and are responsible for funding the 
loan in the global syndicated loan market by attracting other banks to 
become members of a loan syndicate (Gatti et al., 2008). As these loans are 
non-recourse – e.g. they finance the project company with no or only limited 
support from the sponsors – the syndicate bears much of the project's 
business risk. Given the project’s high leverage, business risk must be 
reduced to a feasible level. Here lies one of the key comparative advantages of 
project finance: It allows the allocation of specific project risks (i.e., 
completion and operating risk, revenue and price risk, and the risk of 
political interference or expropriation) to those parties best able to manage 
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them (Brealey et al., 1996). Thus, project finance comprises not only financial 
arrangements dominated by non-recourse debt funded in the global 
syndicated loan market but also a large set of contractual arrangements 
aimed at risk management.  
These specific characteristics of project finance enable it to substitute 
underdeveloped financial markets and emulate, in part, the desirable 
features of a well-developed market. Like any other type of finance, project 
finance is of course most successful in a transparent environment where 
contracts are respected because adjusting the structure of project finance to 
deal with market failures will be costly and imperfect (Ahmed, 1999). The 
important point is, however, that project finance still functions relatively well 
in the least developed countries (LDCs). Most other types of capital, such as 
FDI, are not very effective in substituting the market, making project finance 
an attractive choice for LDCs. 
As stated earlier, the five main functions of a financial market are: (1) 
ex-ante information production and efficient allocation of capital, (2) ex-post 
monitoring of investments and exerting corporate governance, (3) facilitation 
of diversification and management of risk, (4) mobilization and pooling of 
savings and (5) facilitation of transactions (Levine, 1997). If markets are 
underdeveloped and do not function well in these areas the transaction costs 
of capital increase. For each of the five functions, we will show how the 
structure of project finance allows it to substitute the domestic market and 
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control transaction costs. The advantages are especially pronounced in the 
fields of information production and corporate governance.4  
First, consider transaction costs arising from a lack of information on 
possible investments and inefficient capital allocation. Ex-ante evaluation of 
investments is costly for individual investors. Financial intermediaries 
reduce the costs of acquiring and processing information and thereby improve 
resource allocation (Boyd and Prescott, 1986). Project finance reduces these 
costs as a syndicate of banks provides the majority of the funds and delegates 
the major screening and arranging tasks to the syndicate’s lead banks. The 
project is separated from the sponsoring firm or firms and only a single 
investment rather than the overall sponsor(s) needs to be evaluated.  
Furthermore, project finance can improve the efficiency of capital 
allocation as it targets sectors that are bottlenecks in LDCs. Take the 
example of an infrastructure investment structured as build-operate-transfer 
project finance. While most free cash flows are paid to the syndicate lenders 
and thus not reinvested locally during the operations phase of the project, the 
assets will ultimately be transferred to the government thereby putting 
technology and revenues into local hands. The newly acquired infrastructure 
itself can lead to improved economic growth (Sanchez-Robles, 1998). 
Generally, funds for large capital investments in developing countries are 
                                                 
4 In contrast, Esty et al. (2003) develop a framework for assessing the development impact of 
investment projects. This framework takes a micro-level view and visualizes the impact of a 
project on each of its stakeholders. It applies to investment projects in general and is thus 
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often only available from the public sector. While these institutions fund the 
initial investment, financing repair and maintenance during the project’s 
operation can be problematic leading to temporary or even permanent 
shutdown of the facility (Buljevich and Park, 1999). Project finance can 
overcome this problem by explicitly taking these financing needs into account 
and can thus lead to a more effective allocation of capital. 
These specific traits of project finance are very useful when 
information acquisition is costly and the market is opaque. The separation of 
the project from sponsor improves the transparency of the investment, 
thereby making it easier to screen. The unambiguous assignment of 
screening responsibilities to the lead banks limits free-riding on the 
information acquisition internalizes the costs of the screening and thus 
creates the appropriate incentives to screen. These lead banks can be 
expected to have superior screening skills due to their standing as 
sophisticated multinational banks5, their repeated entry into the project 
finance market and in some cases their regional specialization in developing 
countries. 
                                                                                                                                                 
applicable but not limited to project finance. Due to its more macro-oriented economic focus, 
we decide to follow Levine’s (1997) framework instead. 
5 Leading banks in the project finance markets are typically headquartered in industrialized 
countries with a developed financial sector. Based on project finance league tables provided 
by LPC Dealscan (considering all project finance deals arranged from 1991 to 2005), the top-
10 project finance banks are RBS (UK), JP Morgan, Citibank, Bank of America (US), Mizuho 
Financial Group, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (Japan), Calyon Corporate & Investment 
Bank (part of Credit Agricole), BNP Parisbas (France), HSBC (Hong Kong) and Credit Swiss 
(Switzerland). Banks are listed by nationality and not by league-table ranking. 
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Second, consider transaction costs arising from insufficient monitoring 
and exertion of corporate governance. Effective monitoring induces managers 
to maximize firm value which in turn improves the efficiency of the firm’s 
resource allocation (Levine, 2006). The explicit corporate governance and risk 
management structure of project finance is well suited to serve as a 
substitute for domestic structures and institutions.6 Brealey et al. (1996), 
using the example of infrastructure projects, show that project finance has 
several characteristics specifically designed to deal with agency problems. 
These characteristics are largely independent of the legal framework and are 
thus likely to work when general corporate governance frameworks are not 
well developed: (1) Project finance lenders have a strong incentive to monitor 
due to high leverage and the non-recourse nature of their claim (Hainz and 
Kleimeier, 2008). (2) The separation of the project from the sponsoring firm 
improves corporate governance as management is decentralized and project-
specific incentives are created for managers (Laux, 2001) (3) Furthermore, 
the focus of the project company on a single investment reduces the risk of 
misallocation of funds regarding the initial investment (Brealey et al., 1996) 
while (4) the waste of free-cash flows during operation is reduced due to high 
leverage and the inclusion of a cash-waterfall as part of the contractual 
                                                 
6 It has been suggested that project finance can also stimulate reform in a country (Ahmed, 
1999), thereby paving the way for other types of finance. Although this offers many 
interesting avenues, it is not within the scope of this paper to pursue and test this 
implication. 
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structure. (5) Finally, the extensive contractual structure increases 
transparency about the project, thereby improving governance.  
The flexibility of project finance also allows the choice of a corporate 
structure which best suits the market conditions. The involved parties are to 
some extent free to choose the law that regulates the project (Harries, 1989; 
Ahmed, 1999). A logical choice is the law of the country where the major 
tangible assets are located. However, in the case of an emerging country it is 
possible to choose, for example, the US or UK to circumvent the problems 
association with a possibly not well developed local legal system. 
Another problem that can arise in LDCs is political (or sovereign) risk, 
a cost that is especially difficult to deal with. As discussed above, even 
international capital like FDI that can substitute corporate governance on a 
firm level has difficulties when dealing with political risk on a national level. 
Although project finance also cannot fully mitigate this risk, there is some 
evidence it may at least reduce it. Hainz and Kleimeier (2008) show that 
development banks are particularly effective in reducing political risk and 
can act as political umbrellas when included in the syndicate. Indeed, they 
find that project finance is the preferred financing tool in countries with high 
political risk and poor corporate governance. Similarly, Esty and Megginson 
(2003) show that syndicates adjust their concentration to deal with sovereign 
risk and economic risk. In countries with low protection and high risk, 
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syndicates are large to prevent strategic defaults; this at the cost of 
monitoring incentives that come with more concentrated debt ownership.  
Third, consider transaction costs associated with cross-sectional risk 
diversification: when capital is scarce and investors are risk averse, investors 
will avoid risky high-return projects and seek out safe low-return projects. 
Thus, if investors cannot diversify cross-sectional risk, then savings will not 
flow towards high-return investments which can boost growth (Acemoglu and 
Zilibotti, 1997). Project finance will not alter the risk appetite of the local 
investors, but as international capital it is not limited by the same 
constraints and therefore more likely than domestic capital to flow to the 
abovementioned growth-enhancing projects.  
Fourth and fifth, consider the transaction costs arising from the 
inability to mobilize and pool savings and to facilitate transactions. In many 
cases the required sums for an investment are larger than those offered by a 
single investor. The inability of the market to pool savings and link them to 
investments can lead to severe financing constraints. Closely related is the 
function of the market to facilitate transactions by acting as a middle man 
between individual investors and potential borrowers, reducing searching 
and screening costs. The absence of this function hampers financing (Ang, 
2008). Project finance is specifically designed to deal with large investments 
and the syndicates normally consist of large (international) banks. Therefore 
it should not be hindered much by the inability to pool savings, nor by the 
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inability to facilitate transactions. However, it has to be noted that the 
savings pooled and the transactions facilitated are those of the lenders’ home 
countries, not those of the project’s host country. Project finance can do very 
little to help improve the market’s ability to pool domestic savings and 
facilitate domestic transactions. It can only help in meeting the need for large 
sums of money for single investments which cannot be met by domestically 
pooled savings. 
In sum we conclude that project finance is very flexible and can easily 
be adapted to different economic and political environments. This flexibility 
allows project finance to substitute for underdeveloped financial markets. Its 
structure enhances ex-ante screening and ex-post corporate governance. 
Moreover, project finance is well suited to deal with political risk and suffers 
only minimally from the market’s inability to manage risk, pool savings or 
facilitate transactions. These characteristics provide it comparative 
advantages in underdeveloped markets over most other types of capital. 
These advantages are, in our eyes, likely to stimulate growth in LDCs, as will 
be tested formally in the next sections. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
We will answer the question whether or not project finance is a driver 
of economic growth within a neo-classical growth framework, first developed 
in the Swan-Solow and Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans models. In summary, these 
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models presume that the GDP per capita of each country converges towards 
its equilibrium. In two seminal papers Barro (1991) and Mankiw et al. (1992) 
derive an empirical specification for these models, based on the assumption 
that it is unlikely that a country is already at its steady state. In such a 
setting where countries are not already at their steady states, transitional 
dynamics, such as financial development, are an important determinant for 
economic growth. Our starting model is based on this empirical specification 
and visualizes growth in country i as a function of initial GDP, project finance 
PF and a set of further control variables X: 
ji,
j
j2i2i1i XPF)GDPln(INITIALGROWTH ∑ +β+β+β+β= 0  (1) 
 We estimate equation (1) in two specifications: In our baseline 
specification the selected control variables X include schooling, population 
growth, government consumption, and a dummy for the sub-Saharan 
countries in the sample. In our extended specification, a larger set of control 
variables will be used measuring economics, population and institutional 
characteristics in addition. The set of chosen controls follows Alfaro et al. 
(2004) and comprises the most common variables used in the literature. In a 
refinement of our model, we will also (1) consider FDI and contrast its effect 
on growth with that of project finance and (2) investigate the effect of project 
finance on growth dependent on the economic development of the recipient 
countries. These refinements will be motivated in more detail in section 4. As 
a consequence of our choice of control variables, our data is split into two sets 
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of countries. The first dataset, consisting of 90 countries, includes the 
variables used in our baseline specification. Our second dataset reduces to 71 
countries, due to limited data availability of some the variables in our 
extended specification.7  
Growth is measured as the log-change in real GDP per capita in 
constant US dollar and obtained from the World Bank’s (2008) World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database. Correspondingly, initial GDP 
reflects the log of the level of constant US dollar GDP per capita at the 
beginning of the growth period.  
We obtain data on project finance from the Loan Pricing Corporation’s 
Dealscan database. We select all deals with the purpose ‘project finance’ and 
obtain the total volume of project finance deals from the ‘Totals & Averages 
Report’. The deals are converted to US dollar and aggregated by borrower 
country and year of deal signing. Note that the deal volume reflects only the 
debt financing raised for the project but not the equity investment. We focus 
on project finance deals signed between January 1, 1991 and December 31, 
2005 as Dealscan’s coverage in earlier years is limited to a few countries and 
thus not representative.  
The measure of net FDI inflows comes from the WDI. Thus, for both 
project finance and FDI, we relate the cumulate volume of financing to the 
growth over the same period to limit the measurement error of the data 
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001). The schooling variable is measured as the 
                                                 
7 The appendix contains a complete overview of the countries in both datasets. 
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average total years of schooling in the adult population and comes from Barro 
and Lee (1996, 2001); the law variable refers to the ‘rule of law’ as measured 
by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG); the black market premium 
is the difference between the parallel and official exchange rate, retrieved 
from the Global Development Network database at New York University. The 
other variables come from the WDI: government consumption measures the 
central government’s total government expenditures to GDP; openness is 
defined as imports plus exports over GDP; inflation is calculated as the 
percentage change in the deflator; population growth is defined as annual 
percentage growth. Income and location dummies follow the World Bank’s 
country classification.  
The variables used in the regressions are defined in the following 
manner. Missing initial values are substituted by the adjoining year if 
possible. Averages are calculated if at least 3 out of 5 data points are 
available in the respective 5-year period. Project finance and FDI are the 
cumulative net inflows over the regression period as a share of GDP. 
Likewise, population growth is the average growth rate for the regression 
period. The schooling variable is defined as the log of (1 + total years of 
schooling). The black market variable is the log of (1 + black market 
premium). The inflation variable is the log of (1 + average inflation). 
Openness is defined as the log of (average exports plus imports as a share of 
GDP).  
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We estimate equation (1) as an OLS regression for a panel of three 5-
year periods of 1991 to 1995, 1996 to 2000 and 2001 to 2005 and for a cross-
section of countries over a 15-year period of 1991 to 2005. To control for 
possible endogeneity we also estimate a 3SLS instrumental variable (IV) 
model. As has been pointed out in previous literature8 it is quite likely that 
capital – such as project finance – flows mainly to countries that experience 
high growth rates. If this is the case, simple OLS regressions will overstate 
the true effect of project finance on economic growth. IV analysis provides a 
solution to this problem. 
 
4. Results 
4. 1. Growth and project finance 
Table 1 provides a first impression about the link between project 
finance and economic growth. In the 90 countries contained in our baseline 
sample, $ 908 bn of funds were raised in form of project finance between 1991 
and 2005. Covering 84% of the total of $ 1,077 bn raised worldwide, our 
sample can be said to be representative for the global project finance market. 
When comparing the annual volume of newly signed project finance deals in 
real US$ (2005), it becomes clear that the use of project finance has increased 
over time from $ 16 bn in 1991 to just und $ 69 bn in 2005. The volume of 
project finance loans is highest just before the Asian crisis in 1997 and 1998 
with $ 108 bn and $ 110 bn per year, respectively. While the total numbers 
                                                 
8 See for example Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001) and Li and Liu (2005). 
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are substantial, project finance is relatively small in comparison to the GDP 
of the recipient country. The size of new project finance deals amounts in 
most years to less than 0.01% of GDP. Even in countries where the use of 
project finance is highest, new project finance deals do not amount to more 
than 0.2% of GDP. For comparison, FDI inflows are typically in the range of 
1% to 5% of GDP. Nevertheless Table 1 shows a remarkable trend. High-
growth countries, as measured by the top growth-quartile, raise substantially 
more funds in form of project finance than low-growth countries, the bottom 
growth-quartile: $ 259.5 bn versus $ 16.5 bn in total from 1991 to 2005. Also 
in relative terms high-growth countries have more project finance inflows 
than both low-growth countries and the average country in the sample. 
Although it is too early at this point to postulate any causal relations, it does 
appear from the data that more project finance is associated with higher 
growth. In the remainder of this section, we will investigate whether this 
initial finding is robust. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 presents detailed descriptive statistics of our dependent and 
independent variables for our baseline sample of 90 countries in Panel A as 
well as for our reduced sample of 71 countries in Panel B. Both samples are 
remarkably similar in terms of average growth, project finance and FDI 
stocks, schooling, government consumption and regional coverage of SSA 
countries. The reduced sample contains, however, somewhat larger countries 
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in terms of initial GDP. During our sample period, countries typically grow at 
about 1% annually. However, there is considerable variation in the growth 
rates across different countries, ranging from -5.35% for Congo to 8.72% 
average annual growth in China. Cumulative inflows – e.g. stocks – of project 
finance amount to 0.05% of GDP on average while cumulative FDI flows are 
far more substantial with more than 40% of GDP for the average country. 
But these averages can be misleading as stocks of project finance and inward 
FDI also vary widely over the sample. Malaysia (0.54%) and the Philippines 
(0.37%) have the most project finance to GDP, while Belgium (260%) and 
Lesotho (206%) lead in terms of FDI. A comparison of Table 1 and 2 lays bare 
a general trend in the data. Although the total project finance flows are 
substantial and the large growth notwithstanding, flows of project finance 
remain rather small relative to the GDP of the recipient country. The 
descriptive statistics of the other variables are in line with those of previous 
studies and – as they only serve as control variables in our analysis – will not 
be explicitly discussed here. 
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 shows the results of an OLS estimation of equation (1) for a 
panel of three 5-year growth periods of 1991-1995, 1996-2000 and 2001-2005. 
Regressions 1, 3, 5 and 7 show the baseline specification for a sample of 90 
countries with the selected control variables which include schooling, 
population growth, government consumption, and a dummy for the SSA 
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countries. In regressions 2, 4, 6 and 8, institutional quality (law), the black 
market premium, inflation, and the trade volume (openness) have been added 
and the sample drops to 71 countries.  
First consider regressions 1 and 2 which exclude project finance and 
thus allow us to compare our results to those generally reported in the 
empirical growth literature. Initial income has a significant negative impact 
on growth, indicating that (conditional) convergence is present. Furthermore, 
sub-Saharan countries and countries that experience high inflation or high 
population growth face lower GDP growth, while more schooling and a better 
rule of law have a significant positive effect on economic growth. These 
results are in line with the existing evidence in the economic growth 
literature. 
Turning to project finance, the main results reveal that project 
financial is not unambiguously correlated with economic growth. Regressions 
3 and 4 include our project finance measure and show that, although positive, 
project finance is not significantly correlated with growth. As we postulate 
above that the special characteristics of project finance will be most beneficial 
in LDCs with a weak domestic financial system, this result is not surprising. 
It is likely that project finance is only significant contingent on the host 
country’s economic development, e.g. its income level. Therefore, regression 5 
and 6 interact project finance with the country’s income level, identifying the 
effect of project finance on low-, middle- and high-income countries. The 
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results corroborate our argument. In general project finance is shown to have 
a positive impact on growth, but the effect is only significant for the low-
income countries and not in the middle- and high-income countries. 
To assess the quantitative impact of project finance on economic 
growth in a low-income country, consider the example of Uruguay, Ghana, 
and India. Uruguay currently has no project finance, ranking it around the 
25th percentile; Ghana, with 0.046% project finance to GDP, is very close to 
the average; and India, with 0.057% project finance to GDP, is located at the 
75th percentile. Using the coefficients of regression 6, one can calculate the 
increase in growth when a country moves from low levels of project finance to 
higher levels of project finance. If a country increases its project finance from 
the minimum (Uruguay) to the average level (Ghana), it will raise annual 
growth by 1.6 percentage points over the 15-year period. If it raises project 
finance equal to the 75th percentile (India), it will increase growth by 2.0 
percentage points. When this is compared to the average realized growth rate 
of 2.6%, it becomes clear that how substantial the gains from project to 
growth can be. 
These growth-effects of project finance might be driven by benefits 
unique to project finance. Alternatively, the growth-effects might be driven by 
more general spillovers of project finance as foreign capital. In order to 
distinguish these two alternatives, we include a measure of FDI in 
regressions 7 and 8. Note that in low-income countries, project finance will 
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generally constitute part of FDI. As pointed out in section 2 above, the most 
prominent lead banks in the project finance market are headquartered in 
industrialized countries. Thus, while a project in a high-income country 
might well be financed by a syndicate of domestic banks, in low-income 
countries the syndicate will likely be dominated by foreign banks.9 By 
including FDI as an additional variable in our regressions we control for the 
fact the foreign capital can in general be beneficial for growth. Any remaining 
growth-effects of project finance are probably driven by features that are 
unique to its structure. We find that FDI is highly significant for all income 
levels and that project finance remains significant for low-income countries. 
This indicates that in low-income countries it is indeed project finance with 
its unique features that is beneficial to the country’s growth.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4.2. Robustness checks 
Until now we have not yet addressed the potential problem of 
endogeneity. As has been pointed out in previous literature it is quite likely 
that project finance, or foreign capital in general, flows mainly to those 
countries that experience high growth rates. If this is the case, the results of 
Table 3 will overstate the true effect of project finance on economic growth. In 
the worst case, the results are caused by reverse causality. Robinson (1952) 
                                                 
9 Ahmed (1999) shows that 77% of the total costs of IFC-supported projects are financed by 
international sources and that this share declines as domestic financial markets improve. 
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argues for instance that growth is not caused by financial development but 
that finance simply develops because the economy grows. IV analysis 
provides a solution to this problem. Thus, valid instruments for both our 
financial variables have to be constructed.  
The first logical candidates are the lagged values of project finance and 
FDI. By construction these variables are predetermined with respect to 
current growth, preventing reverse causality. And as flows of capital, like 
project finance and FDI, are quite persistent over time, lagged values are 
good predictors for future capital flows. Wheeler and Mody (1992), for 
example, show that FDI is self-propagating: large existing stocks of capital 
stimulate further FDI flows into that country. As an additional instrument 
we include the real exchange rate. All of FDI and much of project finance 
comes from abroad. A low real exchange rate decreases the relative local costs 
while increasing the relative foreign wealth, making investments in the local 
economy more attractive for foreigners (Bloningen, 1997; Froot and Stein, 
1991). Klein and Rosengren (1994) provide empirical support that the real 
exchange rate is a determinant of investment flows.  
Table 4 reports the IV regressions using lagged values of FDI and 
project finance and the real exchange rate as instruments. The instruments 
prove to be jointly significant in the first stage in all cases10 and the Sargan 
test for overidentifiying restrictions indicates that the instruments are 
relevant. Compared to Table 3, the coefficients increase considerably in 
 27
value. This may result from potential measurement errors in our financial 
variables, driving the coefficients in the OLS to zero. IV corrects this error. In 
any case, as the significance is in general unaltered, it can be concluded that 
the results are robust. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Having shown that our results are robust even when considering 
endogeneity, we return to the setting of Table 3 and re-estimate the 
regressions based on a sample that excludes countries with extremely high 
levels of project finance. More specifically, we exclude all observations which 
belong to the top-5% in terms of project finance to GDP.11 Results are 
reported in Table 5 and we confirm our finding of project finance as a driver 
of economic growth. In terms of the significance of our project finance 
variables, the results are even stronger now that outliers are excluded. We 
now even find some evidence, in regression 1, that project finance is 
unconditionlly associated with higher economic growth. Regressions 3 to 6 
confirm that this overall effect is mainly driven by low-income countries. 
Compared to Table 3, the coefficients of project finance are more significant 
and larger indicating that outliers do not drive our main results in Table 3. 
As in Table 3, the inclusion of FDI does not reduce the effect of project 
finance. Finally, in Table 6, we control for endogeneity and outliers 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 Results not reported for brevity. 
11 The distribution of project finance is skewed with several countries having no project 
finance. We therefore focus only on outliers in the right tail of the distribution. 
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simultaneously and find – in line with our previous results – that project 
finance is associated with higher economic growth in low-income countries.  
[Insert Table 5 and 6 about here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this study we examine the finance-growth nexus with specific focus 
on project finance. Based on the existing theoretical and empirical evidence 
on the impact of finance and growth, we hypothesize that project finance has 
the right features to stimulate growth. The benefits of foreign capital are 
known to depend on the development of the domestic financial sector. 
Countries receiving foreign capital inflows should realize that the quality of 
capital matters more than its quantity. In this sense, not all capital is equal. 
Countries with underdeveloped financial sectors should therefore focus on 
safe long-term capital before encouraging more advanced forms of capital 
inflows. We argue that project finance can adjust to less-than-favorable 
environments in least developed countries and might even substitute for the 
lack of institutional and financial development. Our results show that project 
finance promotes growth in particular in low-income countries. Moving from 
the 25th to the 75th percentile in the use of project finance reveals that these 
countries can gain an up to 2 percentage points increase in annual economic 
growth, ceteris paribus. This result is robust to outliers as well as possible 
reverse causality.  
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Our evidence is consistent with the view that project finance has a 
superior ability to facility information production and good project 
governance. The structure of project finance leads to extensive and effective 
screening and project finance is also likely to flow to growth-enhancing 
industries. With regards to corporate governance, project finance creates 
transparency combined with strong monitoring incentives for the investment 
which are independent of any external corporate governance environment. 
Overall, project finance is an effective tool to deal with high-risk 
environments. Our results lead us to wonder whether project finance can also 
stimulate financial development itself, paving the way for other sources of 
international finance. More evidence is required to answer this question, 
opening up new avenues for future research. 
 
6. Appendix 
6.1. Countries included in samples 
Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin*, Bhutan*, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Burundi*, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Guatemala, Guyana*, Haiti*, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland*, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel*, Italy, Jamaica*, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, 
Kuwait*, Lesotho*, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania*, Mauritius*, 
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Mexico, Mozambique, Nepal*, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger*, 
Norway, Pakistan, Panama*, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Republic of Congo, Rwanda*, Senegal, Sierra Leone*, Singapore*, South 
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland*, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, 
United Kingdom, USA, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
* indicates that a country is only included in the baseline regression sample 
but not in the extended regression sample. 
 
6.2. Data sources and variable definitions 
PF: Volume of all project finance deals signed per country. Source: Loan 
Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan database. For the lagged values of PF used as 
instruments, we revert to data provided in 2003 by Euromoney, the previous 
provider of the Dealscan database. Whereas the coverage in later years is 
consistent in terms of PF volume with Dealscan, Euromoney’s coverage prior 
to 1990s is far more complete.  
GDP and GDP growth: Real GDP per capita (growth) in constant 2000 
US$. Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), Worldbank (2008). 
Income dummies: Dummies indicating if a country belongs to the low-, 
middle-, or high-income group according to the World Bank’s country 
classification. Source: World Bank. 
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SSAD: Dummy indicating countries geographically located in sub-Saharan 
Africa according to the World Bank’s country classification. Source: World 
Bank. 
Schooling: Average years of total schooling of the adult population. Source: 
Barro and Lee (1996, 2001), http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html.   
Population growth: Annual population growth in percent. Source: WDI, 
World Bank. 
Government consumption: Total expenditure of the central government as 
a share of GDP; including both current and capital expenditures, excluding 
net financing. Source: WDI, World Bank. 
Law: Average level of law and order. The variable ranges from 0 to 12 with 
higher values indicating better law and order. Source: International Country 
Risk Guide. 
Black market premium: Calculated as the parallel exchange market 
relative to the official market; (parallel exchange rate / official exchange rate 
– 1) * 100. Source: New York University’s Global Development Network 
Growth Database, http://www.nyu.edu/fas/institute /dri/ 
Inflation:  Inflation as a percentage, measured as the change in the GDP 
deflator. Source: WDI, World Bank. 
Openness: Calculated as the sum of the volume of imports and exports 
relative to GDP; (imports + exports)/GDP. Source: WDI, World Bank. 
FDI: Net foreign direct investment inflows. Source: WDI, World Bank. 
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6.3. Additional results 
[Insert Tables A1 to A3 here] 
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Table 1 
Project finance in high- and low-growth countries 
This table shows annual data for new project finance (PF) deals for our sample of 90 countries as well 
as those 23 and 22 countries with the highest and lowest growth rate over the period 1991 to 2005, 
respectively. These countries represent the top and bottom quartile in terms of economic growth. All 
percentages are shown such that 1.0 reflects 1%. All US$ volumes reflect real 2005 values. 
mean
standard
deviation
maxi-
mum
1991 16,106 0.0001 0.0004 0.0027 1,065 0.0001 0 0.0000
1992 18,653 0.0004 0.0013 0.0069 1,599 0.0007 0 0.0000
1993 18,829 0.0011 0.0034 0.0191 5,121 0.0021 1,929 0.0010
1994 36,063 0.0016 0.0061 0.0386 7,880 0.0035 306 0.0002
1995 40,842 0.0018 0.0052 0.0256 13,064 0.0034 1,567 0.0008
1996 46,656 0.0025 0.0067 0.0384 18,465 0.0061 865 0.0004
1997 108,062 0.0103 0.0351 0.2179 47,384 0.0196 1,949 0.0008
1998 110,050 0.0043 0.0102 0.0761 33,827 0.0085 2,884 0.0009
1999 93,954 0.0036 0.0076 0.0465 18,654 0.0056 2,846 0.0008
2000 86,146 0.0043 0.0136 0.1125 17,409 0.0071 372 0.0002
2001 91,112 0.0044 0.0116 0.0614 34,559 0.0088 1,566 0.0027
2002 59,926 0.0038 0.0099 0.0670 13,553 0.0065 1,388 0.0022
2003 58,306 0.0028 0.0067 0.0353 16,813 0.0073 68 0.0000
2004 53,468 0.0032 0.0079 0.0481 12,998 0.0046 303 0.0009
2005 69,403 0.0027 0.0067 0.0415 17,157 0.0024 481 0.0003
PF volume 
(real $ 
mio)year
all countries
PF in % of 
GDP 
(mean)
PF in % of 
GDP 
(mean)
high-growth countries
PF volume 
(real $ 
mio)
low-growth countries
PF volume 
(real $ 
mio)
PF in % of GDP
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
This table shows descriptive statistics for our dependent and independent variables over the period from 1991 to 
2005. We report statistics for our baseline sample of 90 countries as well as for our reduced sample of 71 
countries. While we use the logged values of many variables in our regressions, we show percentages and $ 
values here for illustration. All percentages are shown such that 1.0 reflects 1%. All US$ volumes reflect real 
2000 values. For the definition of all variables see the appendix. 
25th 50th 75th
Panel A: Characteristics of 90 countries from 1991 to 2005
growth (%) 1.658 1.829 -5.354 1.006 1.699 2.453 8.721
initial GDP per capita (real $) 6351.920 8855.120 131.405 461.402 1590.050 11346.180 33279.510
PF (% of GDP) 0.047 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.057 0.549
FDI (% of GDP) 43.697 44.257 1.526 16.220 34.631 53.967 260.356
schooling (years) 5.160 2.874 0.547 2.983 4.792 7.138 11.999
population growth (%) 1.526 1.111 -4.295 0.727 1.638 2.322 3.659
government consumption (% of GDP) 15.053 5.160 4.776 11.370 13.647 18.563 31.583
SSAD 0.267 0.445 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Panel B: Characteristics of 71 countries from 1991 to 2005
growth (%) 1.748 1.767 -5.354 1.044 1.701 2.453 8.721
initial GDP per capita (real $) 6878.390 9175.310 131.405 637.366 1659.060 11551.980 33279.510
PF (% of GDP) 0.050 0.086 0.000 0.006 0.027 0.057 0.549
FDI (% of GDP) 41.649 37.146 1.526 17.876 35.987 53.808 260.356
schooling (years) 5.585 2.836 0.614 3.361 5.234 8.218 11.999
population growth (%) 1.539 0.920 -0.187 0.684 1.513 2.257 3.659
government consumption (% of GDP) 14.618 4.711 4.776 11.261 13.402 17.977 27.623
SSAD 0.211 0.411 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
law 6.441 3.598 0.830 4.000 6.000 10.000 12.000
black market premium (%) 7.544 25.650 -0.233 0.493 1.291 3.422 193.150
inflation (%) 52.049 275.524 0.411 2.949 7.158 15.137 2302.040
openness (% of GDP) 68.195 33.557 18.753 46.478 60.390 84.294 201.646
mean
standard
deviation minimum
percentiles
maximum
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Table 3 
The impact of project finance on economic growth 
The dependent variable is the growth rate. We report the analysis of the project finance-growth nexus based on 
panel regressions using three 5-year growth periods from 1991 to 1995, 1996 to 2000 and 2001 to 2005 estimated 
with OLS. For each independent variable, the first row reports the estimated coefficient and the second row reports 
the t-statistic. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The subscript D indicates a 
dummy variable. For the definition of all variables see the appendix. 
constant 0.045 *** 0.094 *** 0.044 *** 0.093 *** 0.045 *** 0.087 *** 0.044 *** 0.083 ***
3.743 6.347 3.578 6.239 3.545 5.619 3.579 5.362
GDP -0.005 *** -0.009 *** -0.004 ** -0.009 *** -0.005 *** -0.009 *** -0.005 *** -0.008 ***
-2.663 -4.937 -2.455 -4.713 -2.673 -4.371 -2.604 -4.388
PF 5.546 1.615
1.353 0.416
PF * low income countryD 16.449 * 35.239 ** 17.224 * 35.104 **
1.753 2.440 1.870 2.462
PF * middle income countryD 1.654 -1.237 0.657 -0.657
0.361 -0.308 0.146 -0.165
PF * high income countryD 21.243 12.664 14.924 11.393
1.503 0.866 1.066 0.788
FDI 0.027 *** 0.023 **
3.327 2.479
schooling 0.011 * 0.003 0.010 * 0.003 0.011 ** 0.004 0.009 0.004
1.921 0.527 1.748 0.455 2.001 0.680 1.555 0.665
population growth -0.119 -0.678 *** -0.120 -0.682 *** -0.110 -0.672 *** -0.115 -0.621 ***
-1.299 -3.126 -1.308 -3.136 -1.200 -3.101 -1.275 -2.891
government consumption 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.000
1.242 0.063 1.293 0.091 1.201 -0.284 1.195 -0.148
SSAD -0.021 *** -0.024 *** -0.020 *** -0.023 *** -0.021 *** -0.024 *** -0.022 *** -0.024 ***
-4.800 -5.238 -4.505 -5.065 -4.611 -5.317 -4.931 -5.406
law 0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001 0.001
1.944 1.877 1.463 1.313
black market premium 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.007
0.432 0.465 0.624 0.795
inflation -0.025 *** -0.025 *** -0.024 *** -0.024 ***
-6.678 -6.664 -6.373 -6.616
openness 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.000
0.439 0.332 0.897 -0.132
observations 270 213 270 213 270 213 270 213
adjusted R2 0.135 0.371 0.141 0.372 0.153 0.392 0.188 0.410
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 8Reg 4 Reg 5 Reg 6 Reg 7
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Table 4 
The endogeneity-robust impact of project finance on economic growth 
The dependent variable is the growth rate. We report the analysis of the project finance-growth nexus based on 
panel regressions using three 5-year growth periods from 1991 to 1995, 1996 to 2000 and 2001 to 2005 estimated 
with 3SLS. All regressions instrument PF and FDI with the real exchange rate and lagged values of PF and FDI. 
For each independent variable, the first row reports the estimated coefficient and the second row reports the t-
statistic. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The subscript D indicates a 
dummy variable. For the definition of all variables see the appendix. 
constant 0.077 *** 0.097 *** 0.046 0.078 *** 0.033 0.062 **
2.940 4.300 1.600 3.230 1.371 2.434
GDP -0.007 *** -0.010 *** -0.006 ** -0.008 *** -0.006 ** -0.009 ***
-3.270 -4.710 -2.310 -3.740 -2.342 -3.911
PF 3.925 0.934
0.620 0.190
PF * low income countryD 128.335 *** 70.452 *** 67.309 *** 73.547 ***
4.500 3.660 3.129 3.648
PF * middle income countryD -5.473 -3.838 -9.083 -3.883
-0.790 -0.730 -0.975 -0.661
PF * high income countryD 15.812 12.607 2.200 -0.885
0.680 0.650 0.089 -0.041
FDI 0.093 *** 0.072 ***
4.050 3.921
schooling 0.005 0.005 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.009
0.590 0.810 1.240 1.070 1.397 1.368
population growth -0.753 *** -0.748 *** -0.621 ** -0.707 *** -0.122 -0.508 **
-2.910 -3.400 -2.310 -3.130 -1.202 -2.154
government consumption 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005
-0.060 -0.060 -0.610 -0.570 -0.299 -0.795
SSAD -0.023 *** -0.022 *** -0.027 *** -0.024 *** -0.025 *** -0.027 ***
-3.800 -4.380 -4.380 -4.710 -4.270 -4.964
law 0.001 0.001 0.001
1.430 1.010 1.115
black market premium 0.006 0.009 0.013
0.570 0.850 1.293
inflation -0.029 *** -0.024 *** -0.025 ***
-7.310 -6.170 -6.404
openness 0.001 0.004 -0.004
0.270 1.330 -1.101
observations 270 213 270 213 270 213
adjusted R2 0.292 0.586 0.306 0.582 0.334 0.524
Reg 5 Reg 6Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4
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Table 5 
The outlier-robust impact of project finance on economic growth 
The dependent variable is the growth rate. We report the analysis of the project finance-growth nexus based on 
panel regressions using three 5-year growth periods from 1991 to 1995, 1996 to 2000 and 2001 to 2005 estimated 
with OLS. Observations which fall in the top-5% quantile with respect to project finance are considered outliers and 
have been excluded. For each independent variable, the first row reports the estimated coefficient and the second 
row reports the t-statistic. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The subscript D 
indicates a dummy variable. For the definition of all variables see the appendix. 
constant 0.041 *** 0.089 *** 0.039 *** 0.087 *** 0.038 *** 0.082 ***
3.160 5.710 2.940 5.300 2.920 5.070
GDP -0.004 ** -0.009 *** -0.004 ** -0.009 *** -0.004 ** -0.009 ***
-2.430 -4.460 -2.290 -4.300 -2.130 -4.290
PF 19.346 ** 9.676
2.580 1.420
PF * low income countryD 55.111 *** 39.872 *** 55.751 *** 39.457 ***
3.090 2.630 3.190 2.640
PF * middle income countryD 8.560 0.665 4.750 -0.591
0.930 0.080 0.520 -0.070
PF * high income countryD 22.601 13.673 15.835 12.195
1.610 0.950 1.130 0.860
FDI 0.026 *** 0.023 **
3.230 2.480
schooling 0.011 * 0.004 0.011 * 0.005 0.008 0.005
1.840 0.660 1.890 0.860 1.390 0.810
population growth -0.108 -0.691 *** -0.110 -0.709 *** -0.115 -0.663 ***
-1.180 -3.160 -1.200 -3.230 -1.290 -3.050
government consumption 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.001
1.150 -0.070 0.980 -0.380 0.950 -0.270
SSAD -0.019 *** -0.022 *** -0.020 *** -0.024 *** -0.021 *** -0.024 ***
-4.030 -4.740 -4.320 -5.070 -4.610 -5.150
law 0.001 * 0.001 0.001
1.710 1.480 1.340
black market premium 0.006 0.006 0.008
0.590 0.660 0.830
inflation -0.025 *** -0.024 *** -0.025 ***
-6.710 -6.480 -6.730
openness 0.000 0.002 -0.002
0.150 0.500 -0.510
observations 255 201 255 201 255 201
adjusted R2 0.134 0.353 0.147 0.366 0.178 0.383
Reg 5 Reg 6Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4
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Table 6 
The endogeneity- and outlier-robust impact of project finance on economic growth 
The dependent variable is the growth rate. We report the analysis of the project finance-growth nexus based on 
panel regressions using three 5-year growth periods from 1991 to 1995, 1996 to 2000 and 2001 to 2005 estimated 
with 3SLS. All regressions instrument PF and FDI with the real exchange rate and lagged values of PF and FDI. 
Observations which fall in the top-5% quantile with respect to project finance are considered outliers and have been 
excluded. For each independent variable, the first row reports the estimated coefficient and the second row reports 
the t-statistic. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The subscript D indicates a 
dummy variable. For the definition of all variables see the appendix. 
constant 0.036 0.079 *** 0.029 0.077 *** 0.027 0.068 ***
1.530 3.490 1.270 3.310 1.130 2.880
GDP -0.006 *** -0.009 *** -0.005 ** -0.009 *** -0.004 * -0.009 ***
-2.740 -4.280 -2.170 -4.010 -1.830 -4.270
PF 84.732 *** 33.175 ***
4.290 3.190
PF * low income countryD 111.112 *** 51.841 *** 104.217 *** 45.633 ***
3.840 3.240 3.430 2.870
PF * middle income countryD 35.559 18.124 25.789 9.176
1.520 1.340 0.990 0.680
PF * high income countryD 58.034 *** 22.190 22.811 11.366
2.690 1.220 0.970 0.590
FDI 0.072 *** 0.050 ***
3.350 3.170
schooling 0.014 ** 0.005 0.012 * 0.006 0.008 0.007
2.010 0.760 1.840 0.950 1.050 1.180
population growth -0.066 -0.737 *** -0.111 -0.749 *** -0.116 -0.611 ***
-0.650 -3.350 -1.160 -3.350 -1.190 -2.730
government consumption 0.000 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004
0.060 -0.670 -0.210 -0.710 -0.280 -0.740
SSAD -0.015 *** -0.019 *** -0.018 *** -0.021 *** -0.022 *** -0.023 ***
-2.630 -3.850 -3.160 -4.200 -3.590 -4.480
law 0.001 0.001 0.001
1.400 1.170 1.280
black market premium 0.008 0.008 0.012
0.820 0.870 1.260
inflation -0.026 *** -0.025 *** -0.026 ***
-6.750 -6.590 -7.020
openness 0.001 0.002 -0.005
0.350 0.660 -1.350
observations 255 201 255 201 255 201
adjusted R2 0.253 0.446 0.284 0.467 0.337 0.501
Reg 5 Reg 6Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4
 
 
